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A paper-giver’s job is straightforward. It is to describe some inter-
esting phenomenon or mechanism or effect, make large claims about its
importance for our understanding of the world, and then marshal
evidence to show these claims are true.
Jeffrey Williamson has done his job wonderfully well. He knows
much more about economic history than I do, so I can only defer to his
deep knowledge. But I ﬁnd it surprising that the mechanism described in
this paper accounts for such a large fraction of the phenomena examined.
Let me oversimplify the paper by baldly stating its hypothesis. Then I will
make a couple of remarks about the ﬁndings.
Roughly speaking, Williamson’s argument is that a big demographic
“shock” can have major consequences for cross-border ﬂows of people
and capital. He carefully deﬁnes a major demographic shock as an event
or sequence of events that changes the age structure of a nation’s
population. A virus that kills one out of three people at random across the
entire age spectrum does not constitute a shock under this deﬁnition. (Of
course, the surviving relatives of the deceased might beg to differ.) A
virus that kills one out of three people under age 20 or that carries off
one-half of the population past 65 would represent a demographic shock.
This kind of shock can affect cross-border factor ﬂows through its
effects on relative factor prices in either the sending or the receiving
country (or both). Suppose, for example, there is a baby boom. It might
occur because fertility rises temporarily or because child mortality falls
sharply while the fertility rate fails to decline for one or two decades.
At ﬁrst, the jump in the youth dependency rate will push up
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Investment funds might ﬂow into the country, as overseas investors seek
a higher return. Eventually, the wave of dependent young will become a
wave of young workers. The entry of these new job-seekers will speed
labor force growth, possibly depressing the relative wages of young
workers. The rapid rise in labor supply might increase the demand for
investment funds as employers try to maintain the capital-labor ratio.
Alternatively, young workers facing a loss in relative wages might seek
work opportunities in other labor markets, possibly migrating overseas.
As the wave of young workers becomes a wave of high-saving, middle-
aged workers, saving will increase relative to investment requirements.
In a closed economy, this imbalance would result in capital deepening
and a falling return on capital. In an open economy, it can produce an
outward ﬂow of capital and an inward ﬂow of young migrants. When the
swollen generation enters its twilight years, the ratio of dependent retired
to working-age savers will soar, pushing down aggregate saving and
possibly increasing the demand for young workers.
Williamson reviews four historical episodes in which the effects of
demographic shocks can be observed:
1. European immigration to North America and Australia in the
nineteenth century;
2. African emigration to Europe and North America over the past
twenty years and in the next twenty;
3. The surge of European capital ﬂows into North America and
Australia up through World War I; and
4. The cycle of capital ﬂows into and out of East Asia from 1960 up
to the recent Asian economic crisis.
Williamson’s point is that a major demographic shock can have
important consequences for cross-border migration and capital ﬂows. It
seems to me surprising that the effects of the demographic shocks
described in this paper are as large as Williamson and his coauthors have
found them to be. This does not mean that I think the proposed
mechanism does not exist or that its signiﬁcance is trivial. I have no
quarrel with the theoretical model that underlies the suggested demo-
graphic effect. The model seems very plausible to me. I am simply
surprised that the effects of the demographic shocks can be as large as
indicated here. In some cases, I can think of simpler explanations for the
cross-border factor ﬂows.
Consider the movement of Europeans to North America before the
First World War. If I understand the paper correctly, roughly one-half of
this migration can be explained by demographic shocks on one side of the
Atlantic or the other. But I am uncertain about the nature of the shocks
that distinguished Europe from North America. Millions of working-age
residents of Europe moved out of the Old World, leaving a somewhat
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United States, giving those two countries a population pyramid contain-
ing more people between ages 18 and 45 than would have been the case
without migration. The massive shift of population itself constitutes a
demographic shock that profoundly affected economic progress in Can-
ada and the United States. In what other ways did the populations on the
two sides of the Atlantic differ?
Between 1820 and 1913, 12 million residents of the United Kingdom
moved to North America and Australia. The overwhelming majority
migrated to the United States. In 1820, the fertility rate in the United
Kingdom was 4.0 births per 100 residents. In the United States it was 5.5
births per 100 persons. Life expectancy at birth was the same in the two
countries. By the end of the century, the U.S. birth rate had fallen by 42
percent. In the United Kingdom, it fell almost 30 percent. Life expectancy
increased by about the same amount in both countries.1 These statistics
imply that nineteenth-century birth rates were signiﬁcantly higher in the
United States than in the United Kingdom. Compared with the U.K.
population pyramid, the pyramid in the United States was much thicker
at younger ages and thinner at higher ages. Thus, the U.S. population
pyramid bore the same relationship to the U.K. pyramid of the day as
today’s African population pyramid does to the modern European
population pyramid. In the nineteenth century, people migrated from the
United Kingdom to the United States. Today, people migrate from Africa
to Europe. It is not easy to understand why demographic differences that
pushed Europeans to North America in the nineteenth century should
push Africans into Europe in the twenty-ﬁrst.
Was there a demographic shock in Britain or Ireland that induced
Her Majesty’s subjects to pick up stakes and move to America? I am sure
we can discover such a shock. However, a simpler explanation for British
and Irish migration is that real wages were higher and land prices lower
in the United States than in the United Kingdom. Demographic differ-
ences between the two countries helped to account for some of the wage
and price differences. But the most crucial demographic difference
between the two countries was that land and resources were plentiful
relative to labor in the United States, while people were abundant in the
United Kingdom relative to land and resources. This would have been
true regardless of the shapes of the population pyramids in the two
countries, and regardless of any shocks (aside from migration) to the
shapes of the pyramids. The United States and the United Kingdom
shared roughly similar technologies, and labor was much scarcer com-
pared with land in America than in the United Kingdom. Consequently,
1 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: OECD, 2001), pp.
30–35.
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and Ireland, particularly for the kind of workers who moved across the
Atlantic. Higher wages should have induced urban laborers to move to
the United States. Cheaper land should have induced rural workers to
give up farming in Britain and take up agriculture in Illinois and Iowa.
Some readers might think the potato famine constitutes a demo-
graphic shock that pushed the Irish out of the British Empire and into the
United States. My interpretation is that the potato blight caused a
reduction in the Irish real wage by changing the terms of trade between
one day of agricultural labor and 2,000 calories of nutritious food. The
sharp drop in the Irish real wage increased the wage differential between
Ireland and the United States and made migration much more attractive.
It is easy to conceive that a difference in the demographic structures of
Ireland and the United States reinforced the effect of a wider wage gap.
But even if Irish and American demographic patterns had been identical,
migration to the United States would have seemed preferable to earning
the Irish real wage (which in many cases meant accepting an early death).
Migration to Europe or North America appears attractive to modern-
day Africans, not because of differences in the relative abundance of land
and resources, but because of differences in capital and technology.
Workers have access to more capital and better technology in Europe
than they do in Africa. This means they can earn a higher real wage in
Europe than they can earn anywhere in Africa, and this is true at almost
any level of worker skill. This would be true even if the shape of the
population pyramid were the same in Africa as it is in Europe or North
America. Suppose the population pyramids of Africa and Europe were
reversed. Would Europeans seek to migrate to Africa? Would Africans
wish to remain in Africa? The shape of the population pyramid affects the
percentage of a population that is willing to migrate, because people
under age 16 only rarely migrate on their own and people past 50 can be
induced to move only with powerful incentives (such as religious and
ethnic intolerance). But the shape of the population pyramid has only a
secondary effect on the level of real wages. Therefore, I am surprised that
its impact on cross-border labor ﬂows can be large relative to other
determinants of the real wage.
The last example discussed in the paper is the sharp decline in the
youth dependency ratio in East Asia arising out of the fall in birth rates
after 1960. This case offers much more persuasive evidence of the impact
of a demographic transition (or shock). As long as child dependency rates
remained high, Asian saving rates were modest. When the size of the
active population rose as a result of the entry of a big Asian youth cohort
into the working-age population, labor force growth rates and—eventu-
ally—saving rates rose, boosting aggregate growth through capital deep-
ening. People in middle age save more than people who are forming new
households, as shown in Figure 3 of Williamson’s paper. This suggests
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nation’s saving-investment balance. This in turn can lead to the kind of
current account cycle that Williamson documents.
Bear in mind, however, that the impact of this kind of demographic
cycle is often swamped by other factors that inﬂuence a nation’s saving-
investment balance. I suspect, for example, that some of the Asian saving
cycle was due to factors other than the demographic transition. When
Asian households experienced an unexpected surge in income growth
after national growth rates began to rise, consumption growth may have
lagged income growth because consumption patterns were slow to
change.
In most industrialized countries, the age structure of saving follows
roughly the same pattern over the life cycle as shown in Williamson’s
Figure 3. (Many analysts believe that consumption does not follow
exactly the pattern Williamson shows for people past the age of 65,
however. If income and consumption are properly measured, most older
Americans eventually consume more than they earn at some point after
they retire.) The life cycle of consumption and saving implies that
aggregate private saving will vary as the age proﬁle of the population
changes. However, a variety of empirical studies show that the recent
trend of private saving has not followed the pattern predicted by the
demographic model, at least in many of the leading OECD countries.2
Based on the age pattern of life cycle consumption, economists
would predict that the aggregate private saving rate should increase
along with the percentage of aggregate income that is received by persons
between 40 and 60 years old. The private saving rate should decline with
the percentage of income received by workers past the retirement age and
by families with young children. Barry Bosworth examined this predic-
tion by comparing the private saving rate between 1965 and 1972 with the
rate in the 1984–90 period.3 In twelve out of the thirteen OECD countries
examined, private saving should have increased because of the rise in the
proportion of families headed by middle-aged workers. Across all of the
thirteen countries, the increase in private saving should have averaged
4.4 percentage points of GDP. The private saving rate actually fell in
eleven of the thirteen countries between 1965–72 and 1984–90. The
2 See Lawrence S. Summers and Christopher Carroll, “Why Is U.S. National Saving So
Low?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 1987, pp. 607–35; Barry P. Bosworth, Gary
Burtless, and John Sabelhaus, “The Decline in Saving: Some Microeconomic Evidence,”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1991, pp. 183-241; Barry P. Bosworth, Saving and
Investment in a Global Economy, Chapter 3 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1993); and
Barry P. Bosworth, “Prospects for Saving and Investment in Industrial Countries,” in
OECD, Future Global Capital Shortages: Real Threat or Pure Fiction? (Paris: Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995), pp. 19–45.
3 Bosworth, Saving and Investment in a Global Economy, pp. 62–66.
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GDP.
Bosworth’s ﬁnding does not imply that the demographic cycle in the
OECD countries failed to have the predicted impact on aggregate saving
(although it probably did not). It simply shows that other changes in the
environment swamped whatever effects were caused by the demographic
cycle. My microeconomic research with Bosworth and Sabelhaus on
saving in Canada, Japan, and the United States shows that swings in the
saving rate within each age group in the population were much larger
after 1973 than the impact on aggregate saving of changes in the age
distribution of the population.4 In other words, other factors that inﬂu-
ence private saving within age groups exercised a larger inﬂuence on
aggregate saving than the age proﬁle of the population.
The East Asian experience documented in this paper may be a case
where all the planets are in perfect alignment. We are given the
opportunity to observe a demographic transition in which population
shifts cause the predicted effects on investment and saving. The East
Asian experience conforms with theory in a satisfying way.
Judging from the experiences of the OECD countries over the past
three decades, I conclude that such instances are not necessarily the norm,
at least in the case of aggregate saving. This does not imply that the effect
of demographic shocks is unimportant or uninteresting. It suggests,
however, that other inﬂuences on private saving and investment can have
such large effects that they overwhelm the effects of demography.
4 Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus, 1991, “The Decline in Saving: Some Microeco-
nomic Evidence.”
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